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Increasingly volatile financial markets have
put a premium on accurate forecasts ofinterest
rates. To the extent, however, that market par-
ticipants base their decisions on available
interest-rate forecasts, the value of these
forecasts to an individual investor is
diminished because security prices would
already tend to reflect that information. At the
extreme, the efficient-market hypothesis
asserts that the market efficiently utilizes all
available information in the pricing of
securities, so that market participants
generally can not profit from more accurate
forecasts than those already incorporated in
security prices.
This article examines the degree to which
the Treasury-bill market efficiently utilizes all
available information so as to incorporate the
best possible interest-rate forecast into current
market prices. In other words, it evaluates the
applicability of the efficient-market hypothesis
to the Treasury-bill market. Two types ofinde-
pendent forecasts are examined: an
autoregressive forecasting equation based on
the past history ofthe bill rate, and the forecast
of a selected panel of market professionals.
Statistical tests are used to determine whether
all useful information contained in these two
forecasts is efficiently incorporated into Treas-
ury-bill market prices. The market's forecast is
derived from the "forward rate" implied by
the term structure of yields.
If the market is not efficient, a group of
investors could improve their returns by alter-
ing the maturity oftheir investments in light of
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superior interest rate forecasts. Near a peak in
the business cycle, for example, if such
forecasts correctly foresee a larger decline in
interest rates than anticipated by the market,
then investors should buy securities with a
maturity longer than their expected invest-
ment periods. The yields obtained by investors
would be greater than those obtainable if they
had chosen maturities equal to their invest-
ment period, due to larger capital gains than
had been anticipated by the market. Alter-
natively, if the available forecasts correctly
foresee interest rates falling more slowly than
the market does, the investors utilizing those
forecasts should buy maturities shorter than
their investment periods. This is because
investors would obtain a higher return from
"rolling over" a series ofshort-term securities
than from buying maturities equal to their
investment periods.
Whether or not investors can profit by
"speculating" on interest rates, through hold-
ing other than their normally preferred
maturities, depends critically on whether
available interest-rate forecasts are more
accurate than the market's. If the market is
efficient, the information in these forecasts
would already be incorporated into the prices
of securities, and therefore nothing would be
gained. In that case, investors would be better
off by simply "hedging" their positions with
maturities equal to their planned investment
periods, thereby avoiding possible risk.
This study shows that professional analysts'
prediction of the Treasury-bill rate two quar-
ters ahead are significantly more accurate than
market predictions. This indicates that the
market does not efficiently utilize all available
information in making bill-rate forecasts. Bymaking use ofthe information contained in the
analysts' forecast, an investor in Treasury bills
could have improved his return. We show that
the analysts' ability to "beat the market"
stems from a better utilization of information
about past movements in the bill rate, and also
from a more efficient utilization ofother sorts
of information.
Section I explains the concept ofmarket effi-
ciency and examines the forecasting accuracy
of the market, compared with that of both a
panel of professional analysts and a simple
autoregressive forecasting equation based on
the past history of the bill rate. In Section II,
statistical tests for market inefficiency are de-
scribed and performed, on the basis of these
three forecasts. Both the analysts' forecast and
the forecast from the autoregressive forecast-
ing equation are found to contain useful infor-
mation which is not fully incorporated into the
market's forecast indicating market ineffi-
ciency. Section III shows that the analysts'
forecast contains information similar to that in
the autoregressive forecasting equation, plus
other useful information which is also not fully
incorporated into the market's forecast. Inves-
tors could have traded on both types of infor-
mation to improve their returns in the period
examined. Section IV provides a summary and
some further conclusions.
I. The Concept of Market Efficiency
Efficient financial markets exist when the
prices, or yields, of securities fully reflect all
available information relevant for their valua-
tion. In the case of riskless fixed-income
securities, such as Treasury bills, the relevant
information consists ofexpectations about the
future course of interest rates. Investors then
bid the prices of securities to the point where
expected holding-period yields for securities of
different maturities are roughly the same,
given these expectations. For example, given
the current six-month bill rate, the price and
yield of a nine-month bill depends upon the
expected three-month rate for six months
ahead. New information can develop, but
when it does it is rapidly reflected in revised
expectations and in the prices of securities.
Consequently, in an efficient Treasury-bill
market, investors would not have significant
opportunities for making profits on the basis of
information about future interest rates l .
The hypothesis of an efficient market is an
extreme one, and therefore could not be
expected to be literally true. Past tests of the
efficient-market hypothesis have thus
attempted to pinpoint the level of information
at which the hypothesis breaks down. In these
tests, all available information can be sepa-
rated into three distinct types, or subsets, as
shown in Table 1. The first subset consists of
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the past history ofrates of return, or prices. A
test of whether the market efficiently utilizes
information in the past history of rates of
return, or prices, is called a test of weak-form
efficiency. The second information subset con-
sists of any other information publicly availa-
ble at little or no cost - such as government
statistics on other relevant variables. Tests of
whether the market efficiently utilizes this
kind of information in securities pricing are
calledsemistrong-form tests. The third informa-
tion subset consists of information that is priv-
ileged or available only at significant cost.
Tests ofwhether the market efficiently utilizes
this kind of information, so that profits cannot
be made from trading on it, are called strong-
form tests.
Table 1
Types of Market Efficiency




I. Past History ofPrices,
or Rates ofReturn Weak-Form Test
2. All Other Publicly
Available Information Semistrong-Form Test
3. Privileged or Costly
Information Strong-Form TestThe three subsets of information exhaust
the universe ofall available information; thus,
a market is fully efficient only if it passes all
three kinds of tests. According to previous
studies, the Treasury-bill market tends to be
efficient in the weak-form sense of utilizing
information in the past behavior of the bill
rate. However, the evidence has generally
been confined to very near-term market
forecasts of only up to a few months ahead. 2
Also, little evidence is available on the bill
market's efficiency in the strong or semi-
strong form sense of incorporating other
available information useful for forecasting. 3
In this study, we consider two specific types
of information that the Treasury-bill market
could utilize in formulating a two-quarter
ahead forecast of the 3-month bill rate. The
first is simply an autoregressive forecast based
on the past history ofthe bill rate. The yield on
Treasury bills may vary somewhat predictably
over time, due to the business cycle and/or
predictable patterns in monetary policy. To
pass the weak-form test, the market's forecast
of the future bill rate needs to take into
account any systematic behavior evidenced by
its past history. 4
For the period 1951-IV through 1969-III, we
estimated a simple autoregressive forecast that
could have been used by the market. In this
period, quarterly movements in the 3-month
bill rate followed a significant autoregressive
pattern, ie., past movements of the rate were
significantly related to future movements. An
equation explaining quarterly changes in the
bill rate contained significant lags at 1, 2, 3,
and 6 quarters, as well as a significant constant
term indicating a positive time trend. We then
obtained autoregressive forecasts for the
period 1970-I through 1979-III by reestimating
this equation on a growing sample ofavailable
observations and computing two quarter ahead
forecasts from the latest coefficient estimates
at each point in time. 5 Whether or not the
market efficiently utilized the information
contained in this autoregressive forecast is a
test of weak-form efficiency.
The second type of information is the
average interest-rate forecast made by a panel
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of professional analysts, and compiled by the
Goldsmith-Nagan Bondand Money Market Let-
ter since September 1969. 6 The forecast period
is again 1970-1 through 1979-III. This period
begins with the first Goldsmith-Nagan sam-
pling of professional forecasts and continues
through the quarter just prior to the Federal
Reserve's October 1979 shift in operating pro-
cedures, which emphasized controlling bank
reserves for achieving its monetary objectives.
We excluded later data on the ground that
both the market and professional forecasters
had to go through a learning experience which
reduced the forecasting accuracy of each by
perhaps differing amounts.
Professional analysts use, either directly or
indirectly, information in the past history of
the bill rate - but they undoubtedly use other
sources ofinformation as well. So the analysts'
forecasts contain information relevant to all
three kinds of efficiency. However, it is not
possible here to distinguish between a semi-
strong and strong test of efficiency. Some
interest-rate forecasts in the Goldsmith-Nagan
sample are not widely circulated, being privi-
leged or costly to obtain, while other informa-
tion may be publicly available. Since we cannot
discriminate between these two types ofinfor-
mation in the analysts' forecasts, we simply
use the term "strong-form efficiency" to refer
to efficient market use ofall types ofinforma-
tion besides the past history of the rate.
In order to test the bill market's efficiency,
we need a measure of the market's forecast of
the 3-month bill rate for two quarters ahead.
This can be obtained from the term structure
of Treasury bill rates - specifically, from the
market's two quarter ahead "forward rate."
This is the interest rate on a 3-month Treasury
bill two quarters ahead that would be required
to equalize expected returns on 6- and 9-
month bills over a 9-month holding period. 7
The forward rate also contains a "liquidity pre-
mium," which compensates investors in the
longer-term security for their sacrifice of
liquidity. So an adjustment for that premium
must be made to provide an estimate of the
market's forecast ofthe bill rate. An Appendix
develops the concept ofthe forward rate moreprecisely, and details the technique used to
estimate the liquidity premium.
For a preliminary view ofmarket efficiency,
we can compare the market's two-quarter
ahead forecast of the 3-month Treasury bill
rate (F;':2) with the professional analysts'
forecast (F~: 2) and the forecast from the
autoregressive equation(F:l~2)' To measure
forecast accuracy, we use the mean squared
error (MSE), the arithmetic average of the
squares ofthe forecast errors - or better still,
the root mean squared error (RMSE), since it
measures the error in the same units as the
forecasted variable (Table 2) . As a baseline for
comparison, we use the RMSE for a forecast of
no change.
After extraction of the estimated liquidity
premium, the RMSE of the market's forecast,
1.24 percentage points, is only slightly lower
than that for the forecast of no change - but
substantially higher than the RMSEs of the
analysts' and autoregressive forecasts.
Moreover, the approach used to estimate the
market's liquidity premium is more likely to
have understated rather than overstated the
true difference between forecast errors, as
shown in the Appendix. These differences
thus suggest the possibility of market ineffi-
ciency. Ifthe estimated difference between the
RMSEs of the autoregressive forecast and the
market's forecast were statistically significant,
then the condition of weak-form efficiency
would not be met. An autoregressive forecast
based on available past information on the
Table 2
Accuracy of Forecasts
Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE)
19701 - 1979111
(percentage points)
Forecast ofNo Change (it) 1.25
Market's Forecast (F:"t-2) 1.24
(Adjusted for Liquidity
Premium as Estimated from
Appendix Table 1, Eq. 3)
Analysts' Forecast (Fgn ) 1.10 t+2
Autoregressive Forecast (Ff't) .94
Treasury-bill yields would have provided a
means for investors to "beat the market". By
altering the maturity of their holdings in light
of a superior forecast they could have
improved their returns.
The RMSE of the analysts' forecast is lower
than the market's, but higher than that of the
autoregressive forecast. Thus, the analysts
may not have made full use of the available
autoregressive information. Still, the analysts'
forecast could contain other information
besides that embodied in the past history of
the rate. If an investor could have profited
from trading on such other information, the
market would also be inefficient in a strong-
form sense. 8 The next two sections provide
tests of forecast accuracy that distinguish be-
tween strong-form and weak-form ineffi-
ciency.
II. Evidence of Market Inefficiency
We first test for weak-form inefficiency by
examining whether the autoregressive forecast
could have been systematically used to reduce
the error in the market's forecast. This could
have been done ifthe market's forecast error is
at least partially explained by the difference be-
tween the autoregressive forecast and the
market's forecast. Symbolically, this relation-
ship is:
i1+2- F::2 = BI (F;"t2 - F;':2)
+ e'+2' (1)
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where i'+2 - F
Il1
2= the market's forecast
error for two quarters
ahead;
F;t~2 = the autoregressive
forecast for quarter t+2
made at time t;
F;':2= the market's forecast for
quarter t+2 made at time
t;
et+2= a random error term.The value of B b at .664, is more than four
times its estimated standard error, given in the
parentheses, indicating that it is indeed signifi-
cantly different from zero. Thus, the
autoregressive forecast could have been used
to reduce the market's forecast error, confirm-
ing the existence ofweak-form inefficiency. In
fact, in an optimal forecast combining the two,
the autoregressive forecast would be given a
larger weight (.664) than the market's forecast
(.336). Also note that the unexplained forecast
error has been reduced to .90 percentage
points (equals the equation's standard error,
S.EJ from 1.24 percentage points (equals
RMSE in Table 2).
Note that this equation can be rearranged to
give the optimal forecast'of the interest rate as
a weighted average of the two forecasts. That
is, it implies:
i t+2= BIF:~2 + (l - B I ) F::2+ e t+2 (2)
In the case of weak-form inefficiency, the
autoregressive forecast would receive a signifi-
cant weight. On the other hand, if there were
no weak-form inefficiency, the weight of the
autoregressive forecast would be insignifi-
cantly different from zero, and the weight of
the market's forecast would be close to one.
Thus, the test ofweak-form inefficiency is that
the estimated value of BI be significantly
different from zero, so that the autoregressive
forecast could have been used to improve
upon the accuracy of the market's forecast.
F:~2 and F~:2 are apt to be highly correlated
in equation (2), tending to increase the stan-
dard errors of the estimated coefficients. So it
is preferable to test for weak-form inefficiency
by estimating equation (1); in addition, this
equation constrains the weights to add up to
unity. We estimated this and other equations
using ordinary least squares, with a correction
for a moving-average pattern ofserial correla-









A second test for confirming the existence
ofstrong-form inefficiency involves generaliz-
The estimated value of the BI coefficient, at
1.15, is over six times its estimated standard
error. It is clearly significantly different from
zero and also not significantly different from
one. Thus, only the analysts' forecast should
be used in an optimal forecast combining both,
because the market's forecast provides little or
no additional information.
This test also supports a finding of market
inefficiency. Whether it is of the weak or
strong form, or both, depends upon the type of
information embodied in the analysts'
forecast. If the analysts' forecast were based
only on the historical behavior of the bill rate,
only weak-form inefficiency would be con-
firmed. But if it contains other information as
well, both weak and strong-form inefficiency
would be indicated.
Two additional tests can be made for the
presence ofstrong-form inefficiency. The first
explains the forecast error of the autoregres-
sive equation by the difference between the
analysts' forecast and the autoregressive
forecast. The significant coefficient estimated
in this equation, given below, indicates that
the analysts' forecast can be used to explain an
important part of the error in the
autoregressive forecast. Therefore, that
forecast contains other useful information
besides the past history of rates.
A similar test can be performed with the
forecast of the Goldsmith-Nagan panel of
analysts, F~:2' as the alternative to the
market's forecast. When the difference be-
tween the analysts' and the market's forecast is
used to explain the market's forecast error, we






33Both of the estimated coefficients are larger
(.337)
+ .321 (F:~2 - F::2 )
(.201)
R2= .498 S.E. = .873
ing the form of the original test. That is, the
error in the market's forecast might be ex-
plained by both the difference between the
autoregressive and the market's forecast and
the difference between the analysts' and the
market's forecast. In symbols,
than their standard errors and significantly
different from zero at the 5-percent level,
indicating both weak- and strong-form ineffi-
ciency.
To summarize the results so far, we have
found that two different types of information
could have been used to improve upon the
market's forecasts of the 3-month Treasury
bill rate, as embodied in the forward rate. The
significance of an autoregressive equation in
explaining the market's forecast error indi-
cates weak-form inefficiency, and the added
significance of the analysts' forecast confirms
strong-form inefficiency. By incorporating the
information contained in an autoregressive
model and the analysts' forecast, the RMSE
for a two-quarter ahead forecast of the 3-
month Treasury bill rate could have been
reduced from the market's 1.24 percentage
points to .87 percentage points (equal to S.E.
of equation (8). In fact, when all three
forecasts are combined into an optimal
forecast, as in equation (7), the weight
attached to the market's forecast is not signifi-
cantly different from zero, at .022 (equals 1 -
.657 - .321). Thus, the autoregressive
forecast and the analysts' forecast contain all
the useful information embodied in the




i'+2 - F~:2 = B I (F;"1-2 - F~+2)
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or in the alternative form,
i'+2 = BIF;I~2 + B2F~:2 (7)
+ (l - BI - B2) F::2+ e'+2
If both BI and B2were significantly different
from zero, then both weak and strong-form
inefficiency would be confirmed. We again
choose the first form of the equation for
estimation, in order to reduce the extent of
multicollinearity among the independent
variables. The estimate of the equation in this
form is:
III. Information in the Analysts' Forecast
The previous section tested whether infor-
mation from a simple autoregressive model
that could have been used to predict the Treas-
ury-bill rate was fully incorporated into the
market's forecast, as embodied in the forward
rate. However, some judgment enters into the
construction of even such a simple
autoregressive forecast. Specifically, if the
time pattern of rate movements is unstable,
the forecasting power of the estimated
autoregressive equation could depend impor-
tantly upon the period of estimation chosen.
Therefore, we should also test whether the
autoregressive information that was actually
used by the professional analysts was efficiently
incorporated into the market's forecast. In
fact, we shall see that the autoregressive infor-
mation contained in the analysts' forecast is
substantially the same as that in our
autoregressive equation.
To approach this question, we decomposed
both the professional analysts' forecast and the
market's forecast into the portion related to
current and past bill rates (extrapolative com-
ponent) and the remainder that is not so
related (autonomous component) .10 The
difference between the two forecasts can then
be decomposed into the difference between
34the extrapolative components of the two
forecasts plus the difference between the
autonomous components. Ifthe difference be-
tween the extrapolative components were
statistically significant in explaining the
market's forecast error, this would indicate
that autoregressive information actually incor-
porated into the analysts' forecasts was useful
in predicting the interest rate, but nevertheless
was not fully incorporated into the market's
forecast - an instance of weak-form ineffi-
ciency. Similarly, if the difference between the
two autonomous components were significant
in explaining the market's forecast error, this
would mean that the market did not incorpor-
ate other useful information available to the
analysts - an instance of strong-form ineffi-
ciency.
The extrapolative components of the two
forecasts were estimated by regressing the
difference between each forecast and the cur-
rent rate on lagged quarterly differences in the
bill rate. Such components can be divided con-
ceptually into three parts (Figure 1). The first
is simply the current interest rate, or a predic-
tion of no change corresponding to a random-
walk hypothesis. If there were no significant
coefficients in the above regression, the esti-
mated extrapolative component would contain
only the current interest rate. The second
component is a time trend, or drift factor, indi-
cated by a significant constant term in the
above regression. The third component is the
part of the forecast related to past changes in
the interest rate, indicated by any significant
coefficients on past changes in the rate.
The best equation explaining the difference
between the market's two-quarter ahead
forecast of the bill rate and the current rate,
chosen on the basis of a minimum standard
error, contained no constant term and no lag-
ged changes in the bill rate. Thus the
extrapolative component of the market's
forecast, E:: 2, is estimated to be simply a
Figure 1
Elements of a Forecast



















Note: For simplicity, this illustration assumes that elements of the forecast other than the current interest rate all
contribute to reducing the forecast error. Of course, this need not be true in general. For example, the time trend,
the part of the extrapolative component related to past changes, and the autonomous component could all be
negative, instead of positive as assumed here. In that case, and given the same realized interest rate, the
forecasted interest rate would be below, rather than above, a forecast of no change; and the forecast error would
be increased, rather than reduced, by these three elements.
35forecast of no change, equal to the current
interest rate (it). Symbolically,
The significant coefficient on the difference
between the two extrapolative components
+ .323 (F:I~2- F~:2)
(.215)
R2 = .484 S.E. = .885
+ .766 (E~:2 - E:2) + .323
(.584)
The estimated standarderror ofthe equation
is reduced somewhat by the addition of the
difference between these two forecasts.
However, neither the coefficient on this varia-
ble nor the coefficient on the difference be-
tween the extrapolative elements is signifi-
cantly different from zero at the 5-percent
level. Thus, neither the extrapolative compo-
nent of the analysts' forecast nor the
autoregressive equation's forecast significantly
reduces the market's forecasting error once
the other is already being utilized. Both con-
tain a positive time trend and extrapolate from
past changes in the bill rate, in contrast to the
prediction of no change in the extrapolative
element of the market's forecast. On the basis
ofthis evidence, we conclude that the analysts
have utilized the available information on past
movements in the bill rate about as efficiently
as possible in their forecast.
shows that the analysts made better use of
information in the bill rate's past history than
did the market. In addition, the significant
coefficient on the difference between the two
autonomous elements indicates that the
analysts made superior use of other informa-
tion besides past rates. The first finding con-
firms weak-form inefficiency, and the second
substantiates a strong form of inefficiency.
A final point of interest is whether the
extrapolative component of the analysts'
forecast utilizes available information on past
bill-rate movements as efficiently as possible.
To examine this question, we simply added to
the right-hand side of equation (12) the
difference between the forecast from the
autoregressive equation and the market's
forecast, and then reestimated the equation.
This gives










F~:2 - 1+2 (A~:2+ E~:2)
- (A:2+ E:: 2)
= (A~:2 - A::)
+ (E~:2 - E:':2)
To test for both weak and strong-form ineffi-
ciency in terms of the autoregressive informa-
tion actually used by analysts in the
Goldsmith-Nagan survey, we substitute equa-
tion (1 I) into equation (4) and reestimate the
latter. The resulting estimated equation is:
i t+2- F:2= 1.10 (A~n~2 - A::2 ) (12)
tive element. It follows that the difference be-
tween the analysts' forecast and the market's
forecast equals the sum of the differences be-
tween the autonomous and extrapolative com-
ponents; or
In contrast, the extrapolative component of
the analysts' two quarter-ahead forecast, E~:2'
estimated in the same fashion, was found to be
more complex. It contains a constant term,
indicating a positive time trend in the interest
rate of54 basis points per year, and significant
lags at 1, 3, 4, and 5 quarters on past changes
in the bill rate. Specifically, the extrapolative
component of the analysts' forecast is esti-
mated to be:
E~:2 = it + .270 - .196(it - it-I) (10)
+ .186 (it-J - i H )
+ .306(iH - i t - s) + .200(i t•s - i H )
The autonomous components, denoted by
A: 2 and A~:), are simply the difference be-
tUloan tho t"ocn.a.r"ttUA fArAf"''lC'f -:lnrl ite' p-vtr<.:lnf\lo:l_
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36These analysts also efficiently incorporated
other publicly available information into the
autonomous component of their forecast. As
Friedman (1980) has shown, the forecasting
errors ofthe Goldsmith-Nagan panel for short-
term interest rates have not been significantly
related to costlessly available information on
past values of macroeconomic series affecting
the interest-rate outlook. These series include
the unemployment rate, industrial production,
price inflation, the money stock, and the
Federal government's deficit.
IV. Summary and Conclusions
We have investigated whether the Treasury-
bill market has efficiently utilized all available
information, so as to incorporate the best
possible two-quarter ahead forecast of the 3-
month interest rate into its pricing ofTreasury
bills. A forecast by a panel of professional
analysts was used as a measure ofall available
information, and the subset of information
relating to the bill rate's past history was esti-
mated by a simple autoregressive forecasting
equation. We found that the analysts' forecast
contained a similar extrapolative component,
based on past movements in the bill rate.
Either this extrapolative component of the
analysts' forecast or a forecast from the
autoregressive equation could have been used
to reduce the error in the market's forecast sig-
nificantly; but both contained substantially the
same information. In addition, the analysts'
forecast contained other useful information for
explaining a portion of the market's forecast
error. Altogether, the tests performed indicate
the existence of both weak-form and strong-
form inefficiency.
Earlier studies of the efficiency ofthe Treas-
ury-bill market, focusing on shorter term
interest-rate forecasts, have usually indicated
weak-form efficiency. In contrast, our results
for a two-quarter ahead forecast ofthe bill rate
show the existence of weak-form inefficiency.
This reflects the positive time trend found in
both the extrapolative component of the
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analysts' forecast and the autoregressive
forecasting equation, but not in the market's
forecast. The market's forecast ofthe 3-month
bill rate failed to incorporate the upward drift
in the bill rate attributable to rising inflation in
the forecast period, even though this drift
could have been extrapolated from past data.
In testing for a stronger form ofefficiency in
the bill market, earlier studies have generally
used current and past values of relevant
macroeconomic variables to measure other
available information besides the past history
of the bill rate. This study used the non-
extrapolative component of the professional
analysts' forecast for this purpose. We found
that this component also contributed signifi-
cantly to reducing the market's forecast error,
indicating strong-form inefficiency as well.
The difference between the overall forecast
error of the analysts and the market in the
1970's was a modest 14 basis points, as
measured by the root mean square error.
Nevertheless, our results indicate that the
above types ofmarket inefficiency would have
allowed an investor to trade on the informa-
tion contained in the analysts' forecast. An
investor could have improved his overall
returns with a strategy ofshortening maturities
when the analysts' forecast was above the
market's and lengthening them when the
opposite was true.Appendix
Estimation of the Market's Forecast
The market's two-quarter ahead forecast of
the 3-month Treasury bill rate is embodied in
the differential between yields on 6- and 9-
month bills. To see this, first consider that
market arbitrage makes the yield on a9-month
Treasury bill equal to the expected return on a
3-monthTreasury bill that is rolled over twice,
plus premiums for the sacrifice of liquidity. In
algebraic terms, the yield on the 9-month
Treasury bill is:
are generally unbiased, so that the realized
interest rate is approximately equal to the anti-
cipated interest rate plus a random error:
(4)
The market's forward rate (f) is composed of




If the liquidity premium were constant, it
could be estimated simply from the average
difference between the forward rate and subse-
quently realized interest rate. But previous
research indicates that liquidity premiums are
in fact somewhat variable. Three not mutually
exclusive hypotheses have received support in
the literature.
The first hypothesis views short-term
securities as better substitutes for money bal-
ances than longer-term securities. Ifthis is so,
the liquidity premium would tend to be
affected by the level of interest rates. When
interest rates are high, the foregone interest
income in holding money is larger; and so the
public desires to exchange part of its money
balances for securities. However, if the public
prefers short to long securities in this
exchange, prices of short-term securities
would be bid up relative to those on longer-
term ones. This would increase long-term
interest rates relative to returns on short-term
securities, or in other words increase the
liquidity premium. Thus, if short-term
securities are bettersubstitutes for money than
longer-term ones, liquidity premiums would
vary positively with the level ofinterest rates. II
Subtracting (4) from (5), we obtain the
liquidity premium as equal to the difference
between the market's forward rate and the
realized interest rate plus the random (expec-
tationaO error:
0)
Dividing (0 by (2) and rearranging terms, we
obtain equation (3) for the market's two-
quarter ahead "forward rate." This is the
expected return (including a liquidity pre-
mium) on a 3-month Treasury bill two quar-
ters ahead that is required to bring about
equality between the expected returns on 6-
and 9-month bills over a 9-month holding
period.
o+ 3i) 3
To evaluate the accuracy and information
content of the market's two-quarter ahead
forecast, it is necessary to separate the liquidity
premium from the forward rate. The approach
used here assumes that market expectations
where i = yield at a quarterly rate,
p = liquidity premium,
left subscript = maturity ofsecurity in
quarters,
right subscript = time at which
investment in security begins in quar-
ters,
superscript "e" = interest rate
expected by the market as of time t.
Similarly, for a 6-month Treasury bill:
0+ 2it)2= 0 + lit) 0 + li e
t+ l+ IPt+l) (2)
38Two other hypotheses relate to the fact that
liquidity premiums on longer-term securities
compensate investors for exposure to the risk
of capital losses. The greater the probable
variation in interest rates, the larger would be
such risk. If the variation in interest rates is
expected to approximate its recent variance,
liquidity premiums ought to vary positively
with that variance. Moreover, at times when
interest rates are abnormally low (high), there
is a large likelihood of unanticipated increases
(decreases) producing unanticipated capital
losses (gains) for holders of longer-term
securities. Therefore, liquidity premiums
might also be expected to vary inversely with
the height of interest rates relative to recently
experienced levels. 12
These three hypotheses were tested with
available data for the period 1963-IV through
1979-III (Table A.1). Following equation (6),
we regressed the difference between the two-
quarter ahead forward rate and the realized
Treasury-bill rate on the current level of the
Treasury-bill rate (j), the difference between
its current level and a weighted average of its
value over the previous 2 years (i -n, and the
standard deviation of the bill rate over the
same period (SD).13 When no explanatory
variables other than a constant term are
included, the constant term is significantly
pQ$itive - indicating a positive average
liquidity premium of 54 basis points.
The level of the bill rate (reflecting the
effect of better substitutability between short-
term securities and money) and the deviation
of the bill rate from its recent trend (proxying
for the probability of unanticipated capital
gains on long-term securities) show significant
effects when entered together. So also does the
moving standard deviation of the bill rate
when entered alone. But when all three varia-
bles are entered together, only the standard
deviation retains at least marginal significance.
Also the equation containing only the moving
standard deviation of the bill rate explains
more of the variation in the liquidity premium
than does the equation containing the other
two variables. Mainly on statistical grounds,
we chose this equation ((3) in Table A.1) for
separating out the liquidity premium from the
Table A.1.
Estimation of liquidity Premium in the Two-Quarter Ahead
Three-Month Forward Rate (percentage points)
19631V - 1979111
Constant i-i SO R
2 D.W. S.E.
(I) .540 .000 1.28* 117
(.134)**
(2) -1.30 3.54 -.443 .148 1.67** 1.08
(.565)** (I.03)** (.153)**
(3) -1.56 .162 .175 1.53** 1.07
(.565)** (.0424)**
(4) -1.49 -.0909 .195 .169 1.62** 1.07
(.578)** (.120) (.0611)**
(5) -1.49 -.0746 .158 .166 1.62** 1.07
(.582)** (.126) (.0431)**
(6) -1.58 -.602 .545 .409 .165 1.51** 1.07
(.560)*- (.645) (.675) (.273)
Note: Standard errors are in the parentheses.•• indicates a regression coefficient that is significantly different
from zero at the 1- percent level on the basis of a single-tailed test; and' indicates significance at the 5-percent
level. The same symbols on the Durbin-Watson statistic (OW.) indicate the absence of significant serial correla-
tion in the residuals at the 5- and 1-percent levels, respectively.
39forward rate to arrive at an estimate of the
market's anticipated 3-month bill rate.
Because this equation has a minimum standard
error, the resulting estimate of the market's
forecast has a minimum forecast error.
However, equations incorporating the other
variables did about as well; and our results are
not particularly sensitive to this choice.
The procedure used to estimate the liquidity
premium assumes that the market's true
expectational error, v, is uncorrelated with the
variables used to model the liquidity premium.
To the extent that this condition is not met,
the estimated liquidity premium captures a
portion of the market's true expectational
error. This portion of the true expectational
error would then be removed from the esti-
mate of the market's forecast when the esti-
mated liquidity premium is subtracted from
the forward rate. As a simple example of the
problem, if the true expectational error is
positively biased, the procedure would over-
estimate the liquidity premium and correspon-
dingly underestimate the size of the market's
forecast errors.
We investigated the seriousness of this
problem by regressing the difference between
the forecast ofthe Goldsmith-Nagan panel and
the realized interest rate on the variables used
in Table A.l to explain the liquidity premium.
The estimated coefficients from these regres-
sions carried the same signs as those in Table
A.l and were frequently statistically signifi-
cant, indicating that these variables are capable
of proxying for a portion of the analysts'
forecast errors. However, the size of these
coefficients was generally considerably smaller
than those in Table A.I., as would be true if
these variables were also related to the
market's liquidity premium.
To minimize inclusion of expectational
errors, we estimated the liquidity-premium
models on all available data going back to
1963, rather than just on the forecast period of
1971-1 thru 1979-111. This reduced contamina-
tion of the estimated liquidity premium with
40
expectational error, because the additional
data allowed more of an ex ante estimation. A
purely expost fit ofthe forward rate's forecast-
ing error against the liquidity-premium varia-
bles would have generated a larger bias.
Even so, our estimate of the liquidity pre-
mium appears to have picked up some of the
true expectational error in the market's
forecast. This was tested for by removing from
both the analysts' forecast and the market's for-
ward rate the portion of the respective
forecast error associated with the moving stan-
dard deviation of the bill rate (and a constant
term) during 1971-1 thru 1979-IIl. These
adjusted forecasts were obtained by regressing
each forecast error on the moving standard
deviation of the bill rate, and subtracting the
values predicted by these regression equations
from each respective forecast. The procedure
removes a similar amount of true expecta-
tional error from both forecasts, but also an
estimated liquidity premium from the
market's forward rate. The RMSE's of these
adjusted forecasts are 1.01 and 1.18 percentage
points for the analysts' and the forward rate,
respectively. The difference of 17 basis points
exceeds the 14-basis-point difference between
the RMSE's of the analysts' forecast and our
estimate of the market's forecast, suggesting
that our estimate of the latter tends to under-
estimate the size of its forecasting error.
The procedure used for estimating the
liquidity premium has thus tended to under-
state the difference in true expectational errors
between the market's forecast and the two
alternative forecasts. A possible bias in the
opposite direction could result from the omis-
sion ofan important variable for explaining the
liquidity premium. However, we have already
considered all such possibilities. On balance, it
is more likely that our estimate ofthe market's
liquidity premium has understated, rather than
overstated, the true difference between the
forecast errors ofthe market and those ofalter-
native forecasts.FOOTNOTES
Lit= .118 + .239 Lit_1 - .241 Lit_2
(.055) (1.19) (.120)
market prices. Any systematic pattern in expected
short-period returns would quickly be eliminated as
investors bid prices up or down in attempts to profit
from them. In contrast, the returns on 3-month Treas-
ury bills held to maturity cannot be affected by this
kind of speculation, because the price at the end. of
the 3 months is fixed contractually. Therefore, even a
fully anticipated time pattern in 3-month Treasury bill
yields is not likely to be arbitraged away in an effi-
cient market. However, an efficient market would take
such a pattern into account in its bill-rate forecasts.
5. The data sample was extended back to 1951-IV
using Salomon Brothers, An Analytical Record of
Yields and Yield Spreads. The best autoregressive
equation for explaining quarterly changes in the 3-
month Treasury bill rate during 1951-IV thru 1969-111
was found to be:
Standard errors are indicated in the parenthesis. A
two-step ahead forecast from this autoregressive
model of quarterly changes was found to be con-
siderably more accurate than a one-step ahead
forecast from past changes over six-month periods.
Hence, the two-step ahead forecast (with coefficients
reestimated at each point in time) was used for Ff~2'
6. The author wishes to thank Mr. Peter Nagan of The
Goldsmith-Nagan Bond and Money Market Letter for
permitting use of this data.
7. A large body of literature exists on the term struc-
ture of interest rates. Useful surveys are contained in
Dodds and Ford (1974), Malkiel (1966), and Van
Horne (1966).
An alternative measure of the market's forecast can
be obtained from yields on Treasury-bill futures con-
tracts. We did not examine the accuracy of this type
of forecast because a futures market in 3-month
Treasury bills has existed only since January 1976,
reducing the number of observations by more than
half. For a comparison of yields on futures contracts
and implied forward rates, see Lang and Rasche
(1978) and Poole (1978).
8. Prell (1973) compared the accuracy of forecasts
by the Goldsmith-Nagan panel of analysts with those
of no change and an autoregressive model for 1970
through 1973. In that period, the RM8E of the
Goldsmith-Nagan panel for a two-quarter ahead pre-
diction of the 3-month bill rate was smaller than for
both of these forecasts. However, for long-term bond
yields, the panel's forecasts were no more accurate
than a forecast of no change. Prell (1973) did not
compare the accuracy of the analysts' forecast with
those of the market implied by the forward rate, as
would be necessary for a test of bill-market effi-
- .126 Lit_3 - .338 Lit_6
(.124) (.122)
DW.=1.93 S.E. = .449 f'l2=.193
1. Tests of market efficiency were first applied to the
stock market. Surveys of this literature are contained
in Cootner (1964), Fama (1970), and Lorie and
Hamilton (1973, Ch. 4).
2. The weak form of the efficient-market hypothesis
has been tested in several ways in the bill market.
One approach is to determine whether the forward
rate applicable to any particular point in time follows a
random walk. If the market's adjustment to new infor-
mation is virtually instantaneous, as in an efficient
market, successive changes in the forward rate
applicable to any particular period should be random.
This approach is followed in Shiller (1973) and Roll
(1970).
A second approach to testing the weak form is to
determine whether the market reacts appropriately to
any autocorrelation in the bill rate. While changes in
the forward rate applicable to any particular time
period should be random, it does not follow that for
weak-form efficiency the spot rate should also follow
a random walk. Indeed, in an efficient market the for-
ward rate should extrapolate any systematic autocor-
relation that tends to occur in the spot rate. Evidence
of weak-form efficiency in market forecasts of up to a
few months ahead is contained in Hamburger and
Platt (1975), Fama (1975b), and Fildes and Fitzgerald
(1980).
Fama (1975a, 1977) takes a rather different
approach by focusing on the relationship between the
nominal Treasury-bill rate and the subsequently
observed inflation rate. For weak-form efficiency, the
nominal interest rate would summarize all the infor-
mation about future inflation rates contained in the
time series of past inflation rates, so long as the
expected real return is constant. Fama argues that
the Treasury-bill market is efficient in this sense, and
also that expected real returns on Treasury bills are
approximately constant. Carlson (1977), Joines
(1977), and Nelson and Schwer! (1977) present con-
trary evidence on the constancy of the expected real
rate, but their evidence with respect to weak-form
efficiency is not conclusive.
3. Hamburger and Platt (1975) conduct a test of the
semistrong form of efficiency by investigating
whether variables other than current and past levels
of interest rates are better than forward rates in pre-
dicting future bill rates. They considered such poten-
tial predictors as the current and past values of per-
sonal income and three alternative monetary aggre-
gates, but found that the root-mean-squared error for
such forecasts was no smaller than from a forecast
using the forward rate, consistent with the semistrong
form of efficiency.
4. For the market to be considered efficient, the
Treasury-bill rate does not necessarily have to follow
a random walk, in which the change in the return from
one period to the next is completely random. A ran-
dom walk would be consistent with weak-form effi-
ciency in stock and bond markets because short-
period returns on these securities are dominated by
capital gains or losses resulting from changes in
41